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SCIENCE FORUM

Improving pandemic influenza
risk assessment
Abstract Assessing the pandemic risk posed by specific non-human influenza A viruses is an
important goal in public health research. As influenza virus genome sequencing becomes cheaper,
faster, and more readily available, the ability to predict pandemic potential from sequence data
could transform pandemic influenza risk assessment capabilities. However, the complexities of the
relationships between virus genotype and phenotype make such predictions extremely difficult. The
integration of experimental work, computational tool development, and analysis of evolutionary
pathways, together with refinements to influenza surveillance, has the potential to transform our
ability to assess the risks posed to humans by non-human influenza viruses and lead to improved
pandemic preparedness and response.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.001
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Influenza pandemics arise when antigenically
novel influenza viruses enter and spread extensively in the human population. By this definition,
there have been five influenza pandemics in the
last 100 years, the worst of which cost 50 million
lives worldwide (Johnson and Mueller, 2002).
Of these pandemics, three likely arose from the
introduction of genes from avian viruses into the
human population (1918—H1N1, 1957—H2N2,
1968—H3N2 (dos Reis et al., 2009; Neumann
et al., 2009, Worobey et al., 2014)), one arose
from the introduction of a swine virus (2009—
H1N1 (Smith et al., 2009)), and one was likely
due to the unintended reintroduction of a previously widespread human virus that had not been
seen in humans for two decades (1977—H1N1
(dos Reis et al., 2009, Nakajima et al., 1978,
Palese, 2004)). However, the viruses responsible
for these pandemics represent only a tiny fraction
of the total diversity of influenza A viruses that
exist in nature (Webster et al., 1992). Assessing
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which viruses pose the greatest risk of causing the
next human pandemic is an enormous challenge.
Pandemic influenza risk assessment faces a
fundamental problem: a paucity of empirical data
on the differences between pandemic viruses
and their immediate ancestors from non-human
hosts. The challenge was clearly articulated by
Harvey Fineberg in his analysis of the US government's response to the 1976 swine influenza
scare (Fineberg, 2009): ‘The first lesson is to
avoid over-confidence about scientific insights.
Major flu pandemics arise on average only about
three times every century, which means scientists can make relatively few direct observations
in each lifetime and have a long time to think
about each observation. That is a circumstance
that is ripe for over-interpretation.’
Core elements of current approaches to pandemic preparedness and mitigation, such as
the development of vaccines and stockpiling of
antiviral drugs, require detailed virological and
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immunological data on viruses with perceived
pandemic potential and ample lead time for production (Jennings et al., 2008, Keitel and Piedra,
2014). The substantial diversity of known influenza
viruses in non-human hosts, and the frequent identification of new viruses, makes extensive experimental testing and development of pandemic
preparedness measures against all viruses unfeasible. Thus, there is a need for continuing attempts
to assess the pandemic risks posed by non-human
viruses in order to prioritize viruses of concern
for pandemic preparedness planning. Currently,
influenza pandemic risk assessment is largely
driven by a simple idea: animal viruses that cause
sporadic human infections are thought to pose a
greater pandemic risk than viruses that have not
been documented to infect humans (Figure 1).
This intuitively attractive idea does not have direct
empirical support, as none of the viruses that
caused the 1918, 1957, 1968, or 2009 pandemics
was detected in humans before they emerged in
their pandemic form (Smith et al., 2009). This is
largely due to a lack of surveillance (1918, 1957,
and 1968 pandemics) and to the mistaken assumption that virus subtypes already circulating in
humans were unlikely to cause pandemics (2009
pandemic) (Peiris et al., 2012). However, increased
surveillance has probably improved the chance
that the next pandemic virus will be identified
prior to sustained human-to-human transmission.

If it is true that influenza surveillance has the
possibility of identifying potential pandemic viruses
before they begin to spread extensively between
humans, then improving the basis for assessment
of the risks posed by those viruses is an important
goal. The level of public health concern about
identified non-human influenza viruses should be
a function of the potential of each virus to gain
the ability to transmit efficiently from human to
human and the severity of disease that such a
virus would cause should it become pandemic.
These two high-level phenotypes are each determined by the interaction of a number of biochemical traits of the virus during human infection
(Figure 2) (Chou et al., 2011, Hatta et al., 2001,
Kobasa et al., 2004, Labadie et al., 2007, Yen
et al., 2011), the state of immunity to that influenza virus in human populations at the time of
emergence (Miller et al., 2010, Xu et al., 2010),
and by environmental factors such as temperature and humidity (Shaman et al., 2011).
Currently, the primary tool that uses multiple
data streams for assessing pandemic risk is the
Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT) (Cox et al.,
2014, Trock et al., 2012). The IRAT integrates
existing knowledge, including information on virus
transmissibility and disease severity, with expert
opinion about potential pandemic viruses to
assign relative risk scores to those viruses. The IRAT
is useful for identifying key gaps in knowledge,

Figure 1. Evidence for concern and actions to mitigate influenza pandemics. Types of evidence that have been, or could be, used to justify specific
preparedness or mitigation actions prior to evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission, largely based on the authors' interpretation of national
and international responses to H5N1, H7N9, and H3N2v outbreaks (Epperson et al., 2013, WHO, 2011). Red indicates largely sufficient, orange partly
sufficient, yellow minimally sufficient, gray insufficient. * high pathogenicity phenotype as defined by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
(OIE, 2013).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.002
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focusing risk management efforts, and providing clear documentation of decision rationales. However, to be used optimally, the IRAT
requires a substantial amount of experimental
data about virus phenotypes including information
on receptor binding, transmissibility in laboratory
animals, and antiviral treatment susceptibility.
In the absence of phenotype data, preliminary
assessments with the IRAT must rely on extrapolations from related viruses, which are prone to
subjective interpretation.
The biochemical traits that determine virus
phenotypes are themselves determined by the
genetic sequence of the virus (Figure 2). In theory,
it might eventually be possible to predict virus
phenotype directly from virus sequence data.
However, the complexities of the relationships
between sequences and traits and from traits to
disease phenotypes, make the prediction of pandemic potential from genomic sequence a tremendous challenge. Here, we discuss ways in
which laboratory experiments, together with computational and theoretical developments, could
improve genotype-to-phenotype prediction and,
in conjunction with enhanced surveillance, improve
assessment of the risks posed to humans by nonhuman influenza viruses.

Experimental approaches
One goal of experimental studies on non-human
influenza viruses is to identify general virus traits
that are likely to affect transmissibility between
humans, and then relate those traits to specific
virus sequence changes. For obvious reasons, direct
experimental assessment of human-to-human

transmission of potential pandemic viruses is
not feasible. However, influenza viruses that have
caused pandemics in humans have been shown
to transmit efficiently in animal models (most
commonly ferrets) (Chou et al., 2011, Yen et al.,
2011), thus animal models are thought to be
useful for examining the genetic changes in viruses
that facilitate human-to-human transmission. For
example, several studies have shown that genetic
changes in the neuraminidase (NA) and matrix
(M) gene segments acquired by the virus lineage
responsible for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic increased
transmissibility in animal models (Chou et al., 2011,
Lakdawala et al., 2011, Yen et al., 2011), suggesting that these changes may have played a
role in enhancing the virus's transmissibility in
humans and hence paved the way for pandemic
emergence. When animal experiments provide
quantitative measures of virus traits, these can
be integrated into quantitative measures of risk
assessment such as the IRAT (Trock et al., 2012).
Recently, several high-profile and controversial gain-of-function (GoF) studies have attempted
to go beyond the characterization of existing
viruses to prospectively identify new mutations
in avian H5N1 viruses that enhance the ability of
these viruses to transmit between ferrets by the
airborne route (Chen et al., 2012, Herfst et al.,
2012, Imai et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 2013).
Important questions about the relative risks and
benefits of these studies have been debated extensively elsewhere (Fauci, 2012; Fouchier et al.,
2013; Lipkin, 2012; Casadevall and Imperiale,
2014; Lipsitch and Galvani, 2014); here, we focus
on scientific considerations.

Figure 2. Schematic of potential relationships from virus genetic sequence to level of public health concern/pandemic risk. Pandemic risk is a combination of the probability that a virus will cause a pandemic and the human morbidity and mortality that might result from that pandemic. Arrows represent
possible relationships between levels and are not intended to summarize current knowledge.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.003
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Because of the vast size of genetic space, such
studies cannot possibly delineate all genetic variants of a virus that might be transmissible—after
all, there are more than 1018 different possible
five-mutation variants of any given hemagglutinin (HA), which is more than what can reasonably be assayed experimentally and the vast
majority will not facilitate transmissibility. A more
modest goal is to attempt to associate classes of
genetic or phenotypic traits with transmissibility.
Transmissibility traits identified by GoF studies
to date include some that were already known
(such as switching receptor binding from avianlike α2,3 sialic acid to human-like α2,6 sialic acid
linkages (Yamada et al., 2006) and lowering
the optimal temperature for viral polymerase
activity (Massin et al., 2001)), as well as some
that are new, such as increasing HA stability and
reducing glycosylation on HA's globular head
(Herfst et al., 2012, Imai et al., 2012). Whether
these traits are either necessary or sufficient for
transmissibility among humans or even other
mammalian animal models remains unclear. For
example, a recent study of an avian H5N1 virus
found that by reassorting its internal genes with
those of a 2009 pandemic virus, the virus could
be rendered transmissible in guinea pigs (which
have both α2,6 and α2,3 sialic acid in the upper
respiratory tract) despite retaining a preference
for binding α2,3 sialic acid. However, when mutations identified in earlier ferret GoF experiments
were used to switch the receptor specificity to
α2,6 sialic acid, transmissibility was lost (Zhang
et al., 2013).
A key question for efforts to assess pandemic
risk of non-human viruses is the degree to which
certain substitutions are general markers for a
phenotype, or whether the impacts of those mutations are dependent on genetic context and/or
specific non-human host. Some mutations have
been shown to be strong markers for phenotype for well-defined collections of viruses—for
instance, the NA mutation H275Y consistently
confers oseltamivir resistance on N1 neuraminidases (although the impact of the mutation on
surface expression of NA, and thus virus fitness,
varies dramatically) (Baz et al., 2010, Bloom
et al., 2010). Similarly, the PB2 E627K substitution adapts the viral polymerase to mammalian
cells in some viruses (Long et al., 2013) but not
others (Herfst et al., 2010), while other viruses
have adapted to mammals via different substitutions in PB2 (Jagger et al., 2010, Mehle and
Doudna, 2009; Zhu et al., 2010). In many cases,
the effect of mutations can be highly sensitive
to genetic context—for instance, the effects of

Russell et al. eLife 2014;3:e03883. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883

cytotoxic T-lymphocyte escape mutations on
nucleoprotein (NP) function depend on the stability of the parent protein, which can be affected
by at least dozens of other mutations (Gong
et al., 2013). Similar patterns of context dependence have recently been shown for receptor
binding specificity substitutions in H5N1 viruses
(Tharakaraman et al., 2013). Therefore, even
when phenotypic traits of interest can be identified, clear genetic markers for these traits are
only present in some cases.
The utility of experimental studies for informing surveillance for higher-risk viruses hinges on
the question of whether virus traits associated
with risk of infection and transmission in humans
possess clear genetic markers. If a trait only arises
from a limited number of specific mutations or
combination of mutations, then experimentally
delineating these mutations would be helpful
for surveillance. For these cases, it is important
and useful for the community to have access to
collections of interpretable genotype to phenotype traits such as in the H5N1 genetic changes
inventory (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h5n1genetic-changes.htm) as well as computational
tools to quickly connect new sequences to the
body of available mutation annotation knowledge
(FluSurver: http://flusurver.bii.a-star.edu.sg/). On
the other hand, if a trait can be conferred by a
large number of different mutations or combinations of mutations, then it will be less effective to monitor specific mutations. In such cases,
it may be more beneficial to focus on the broader
biochemical properties of viruses or their proteins. Developing laboratory capacity for rapid
phenotype assessment would therefore be a valuable complement to high-throughput sequencing of new viruses. Moving forwards, if such
biochemical traits can be clearly delineated and
reliably modeled, then computational simulation
of proteins could be used to predict phenotype
from sequence, even for sequences from viruses
that have never been experimentally tested.

Computational predictions
Computational methods present an attractive
adjunct to experimental studies because they
have higher throughput, have shorter turnaround
times, are cheaper, and are safer than experimental work with whole virulent viruses. The main
drawback of computational methods is the largely
unknown accuracy of their predictions—a drawback that is exacerbated by the lack of an established framework for validating the accuracy of
the numerous computational prediction methods
that populate the literature.
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The elements of influenza pandemic risk assessment that are most amenable to computational
prediction are those that correspond to welldefined, quantifiable molecular-scale traits such
as receptor-binding preference, antiviral susceptibility, antigenicity of HA and NA, and possibly
T-cell epitopes. Higher-level phenotypes such as
transmissibility, that integrate phenomena at a
range of scales, are not yet sufficiently well understood to be reasonable targets for computational
predictions. A variety of computational methods
shows promise for genotype-to-phenotype prediction including molecular dynamics simulations that combine high- and low-fidelity models
(Amaro et al., 2009) and statistical learning
approaches that use protein structure, dynamics,
and sequence data to predict the phenotypic
consequences of mutation (Kasson et al., 2009).
However, better prospective validation of these
tools against experimental data, particularly for
exploring context dependency of genetic changes,
is essential before these tools can be reliably used
for informing public health decisions or policymaking (Figure 1).
Making substantial progress in the development of computational tools and the assessment of their accuracy will require collaboration
between experimental and computational scientists to produce consistent testing and validation
data. One possible mechanism to spur cooperation would be a series of regular community
assessment exercises similar to Critical Assessment
of protein Structure Prediction (CASP) (Moult
et al., 2011). In a CASP-like exercise, one or more
experimental groups would generate quantitative phenotype data for a set of viruses, for example the relative binding of α2,3-sialoglycans and
α2,6-sialoglycans, pH profile of viral activation, or
sensitivity to oseltamivir, and challenge computational groups to predict that virus phenotype
data from the genetic sequences of the viruses
tested. The quantitative experimental data would
be held under embargo while the exercise runs.
Computational groups would complete predictions for these targets, the experimental data set
would then be released, and a meeting would be
held to assess the performance of different methods to define avenues for improvement.
Ideal experimental data sets for CASP-like
exercises include thermophoretic or interferometric measurements of HA binding affinities to
α2,3- and α2,6-sialoglycans (Xiong et al., 2013)
and multi-method characterizations of viral pH
activation shifts for sets of point mutants in HA
(Galloway et al., 2013, Thoennes et al., 2008).
Reliable computational prediction of biochemical

Russell et al. eLife 2014;3:e03883. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883

traits from genetic data would be a major accomplishment. However, it should be recognized that
further major developments, particularly computational prediction of total virus fitness in new
hosts, would still be required for realizing the
utility of computational tools in policymaking.

Evolutionary theory and modeling
In addition to the genotype–phenotype relationship itself, there is a need for better understanding of the evolutionary mechanisms and
pathways that allow adaptive mutations controlling host range to appear and rise in frequency.
These mechanisms act in reservoir hosts, in intermediate hosts (if any), and in humans or other
potential hosts; they also act at multiple scales, as
viruses compete for replication within hosts and
transmission between hosts (Park et al., 2013,
Russell et al., 2012). Developing better phylodynamic model frameworks (Grenfell et al., 2004)
for modeling virus host transfer and adaptation
will require collaboration between theoreticians
and experimentalists.
Specific goals would be to determine realistic parameters for mutation/selection processes
(Illingworth et al., 2014) and virus population
bottlenecks at transmission (Wilker et al., 2013)
and to generate high-resolution data sets to test
and train mechanistic models. Such data-driven
mechanistic models could shed light on additional constraints to virus genetic change, such
as fitness valleys that separate virus genotypes
adapted to one species or another, or conflicts
in selection acting at different biological scales.
For example, at the most simple level of understanding of the role of receptor binding, avian to
mammalian host switching is often assumed to
only require a binary change in receptor specificity
from α2,3 to α2,6 sialic acid and to be directly
related to binding affinity. However, in addition to
the α2,3 and α2,6 linkages, there is a tremendous
variety in the structures of oligosaccharides displaying the sialic acids and in the structure of the
sialic acids in different avian hosts (Gambaryan
et al., 2012, Jourdain et al., 2011). The binding
specificity for each receptor variant form may
affect the potential for different viruses to cross
the species barrier or make the difference between
causing severe or only mild disease. Rich experimental data sets that provide insights on such
factors will improve the power of evolutionary
models to interpret experimental and field data.

Surveillance methodology
Detection of the genetic changes and phenotypes
of concern relies on systematic characterization
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of influenza viruses circulating in wild and domesticated animal populations. If there are virus traits
that correlate with genetic markers observed to
increase risk in humans, or that can be computationally inferred from genetic sequence data, it
could be possible to monitor those markers in
surveillance and adjust risk assessments prior to
emergence in humans. However, the acquisition
of samples entering existing surveillance networks
is largely ad hoc, exhibits substantial variation by
host and geographical region, and only a small
proportion of the data end up in the public domain
(Figure 3). Making non-human influenza surveillance more systematic by using statistical analysis
to determine appropriate levels of coverage by
geographic region and host species would facilitate the early detection of viruses of concern
and also have the potential to facilitate detection
of evolutionary and epidemiological patterns of
virus activity that warn of potential emergence
events.
There are large regions of the world and
many animal populations for which little or no
surveillance is performed but where significant

animal influenza diversity can be inferred to exist.
Systematic assessments of surveillance by geographic area and host species, similar to efforts
for malaria (Gething et al., 2012, 2011, Hay
et al., 2010, Sinka et al., 2012) and dengue
(Bhatt et al., 2013), would help to identify major
gaps where surveillance is either non-existent or
unlikely to be sufficient for timely detection of
viruses of concern. For enhancing surveillance,
prioritizing among these gaps will require substantial improvements in understanding animal
host ecology to identify hotspots for virus transmission within and among animal species. Similar
efforts are required to better understand what
aspects of the human–animal interface facilitate
transmission of viruses between animals and
humans, particularly in animal production and
domestic animal settings, and the human biological and epidemiological factors that promote
chains of transmission of newly introduced viruses.
One motivation for changing existing surveillance systems is to increase their power to rapidly
detect changes in patterns of non-human influenza virus activity. Substantial changes, such as

A

B

Figure 3. Geographic distribution of publicly available influenza virus genetic sequence data in comparison to poultry and swine populations.
(A) Proportions of worldwide animal population by country (data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).
(B) Number of unique influenza viruses for which sequence data exists in public databases from poultry or swine by country. Numbers of
influenza virus sequences are not representative of influenza virus surveillance activities. Information regarding surveillance activities is not
readily available. Virological surveillance, even if robust, may result in negative findings and is not captured in these figures. Most countries
do not sequence every influenza virus isolate and some countries conduct virological surveillance without sharing sequence data publicly.
Sequences deposited in public databases can reflect uneven geographic distribution and interest regarding viruses of concern such as H5N1
and H9N2.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883.004
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the sudden proliferation of a previously rare virus
subtype or of a virus with an H9N2 internal gene
cassette (Gao et al., 2013, GarcÌa-Sastre and
Schmolke, 2014; Guan et al., 1999), could indicate the emergence of new viral variants in nonhuman hosts that should be prioritized for further
study even before the detection of human infections of zoonotic origin (Vijaykrishna et al., 2011).
To be useful from a human health perspective such
detection systems would require sampling of animals with no obvious signs of infection, routine
assessment of particular genetic signatures or full
genome sequencing, and near real-time sharing
of these data; these activities all present potential
financial, political, and logistical constraints.
Further development of surveillance infrastructure in some geographic locations and host species is likely to be unpopular or unfeasible due
to economic disincentives for disease detection.
However, the geographic movements of many
non-human influenza hosts, via migration or trade,
make it possible to identify surrogate sources
of information. For example, by linking virological
and serological data, it has been possible to make
inferences about swine influenza virus activity in
some parts of mainland China based only on the
data from Hong Kong (Strelioff et al., 2013).
A systematic, open, and timely global surveillance system based on viral sequence data would
be a powerful tool in pandemic risk assessment.
Viral sequences, with associated metadata and systematic recording of virus negative sample results,
provide a rich source of information beyond the
simple presence or absence of particular strains.
Phylodynamic reconstructions from even a relatively small number of samples are capable of
revealing lineages that are proliferating (Grenfell
et al., 2004, Pybus and Rambaut, 2009).
Phylogenetic methods can be used to reveal gaps
in surveillance (Smith et al., 2009, Vijaykrishna
et al., 2011). Genetic similarity between viruses
in different locations or host species can identify
drivers of transmission between populations (Faria
et al., 2013, Lemey et al., 2014).
Data on negative samples would provide valuable denominators for estimating the prevalence
of infection: tracking infection rates through time
would give a window into transmission dynamics
and allow investigation of mechanisms underlying
virus circulation. The Influenza Research Database
(IRD) (http://www.fludb.org) includes an animal
surveillance database that contains negative test
data but the amount of data is extremely limited
compared to the global scale of ongoing surveillance activities. Standards should be developed for consistently recording these relevant

Russell et al. eLife 2014;3:e03883. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03883

associated metadata, so that the number of animals tested, the setting in which sampling took
place, and the motivation for sampling associated with genetic data can be submitted in a consistent form to public data repositories, along
with all sequence submissions.

Conclusions
It is currently not possible to predict which nonhuman influenza A virus will cause the next pandemic. Reducing the impact of the next pandemic
will rely on early detection and mitigation strategies that slow the early spread to allow more
preparatory work to be done. The integration of
further experimental data with computational
methods and mathematical models in conjunction
with refinements to surveillance methodology will
increase the feasibility of genotype-to-phenotype
based assessments, increase the power of tools
for more objectively assessing pandemic risk and
decrease the time required for assessing the pandemic threat posed by extant non-human influenza A viruses—all of which can inform strategies
to help mitigate the impact of the next pandemic.
Even as risk assessment capabilities improve,
scientific insights into non-human influenza viruses
must not give way to complacency that the most
substantial threats have been identified and characterized. Despite the perceived risks of highly
pathogenic H5N1 viruses, the emergence of the
2009 H1N1 pandemic virus in humans, the increasing incidence of human infection with H7N9
viruses in China since 2013, and the first documented human infections with H6N1 (Wei et al.,
2013) and H10N8 (Chen et al., 2014) viruses
highlight the importance of remaining vigilant
against as-yet unrecognized high-risk viruses
and the value of surveillance for influenza viruses
in humans. Beyond further scientific investigations and refinement of surveillance capacity, the
development of local surveillance-based outbreak
response capacity worldwide remains essential.
The first wave of the 2013 H7N9 outbreak in
China demonstrated the value of swift coordinated action, including the timely dissemination
of surveillance data, to limit further incursions of
new viruses into the human population. Without
developing similar response capacities in other
areas at high risk of new virus introductions, we
are only building expensive systems for watching
the next pandemic unfold.
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